Since the change of power in April, a period of uncertainty has begun in Armenia, where there are more questions than answers. There are also many questions about the future of civil society. Human rights activists, many members of religious organizations who participated in the mass protests have expectations from the new government. The Prime Minister made many promises during the rallies and campaigns, but soon afterwards, began to abandon some of these promises. In this article we are interested in the state of religious freedom: Will we witness the decades-long solution to the problem or will the uncertain political line of the former governments continue?

In previous years, the authorities have been trying to use the traditional authority of the Church to raise its legitimacy. The conservatism artificially intertwined with Nzhdehism was proclaimed as the ideological basis of the RPA. Liberal economic policy was pursued along with conservatism, however, in the context of patronage and artificial monopolies. At that time, the church enjoyed tax privileges, participated in state ceremonies, had endless opportunities to use television broadcasters in its preaching work. In addition, senior clergymen held diplomatic passports, and senior government officials – prime ministers, defense ministers, the prosecutor general, police chiefs, and others – attended church services in the outfit of the deacon on the altar.

This series of privileges can be long listed. To put it briefly, we can say that the church and the state had merged, and the clergy had in fact become state officials and had immunity. It was no accident that the church had begun raising the issue of salaries for its servants from the state. The institute of chaplains, who receive salaries from the defense army’s budget, was introduced in the army. Such a status among the clergy had a false impression that they had a high reputation in the public. After the change of power, it turned out that they had no significant public influence.

Since the change of power in Armenia, as well as during the December parliamentary election campaign, the religious theme has been repeatedly speculated. Formerly ruling Republican Party during the snap parliamentary elections in 2018 mainly built its pre-election campaign on the preservation of “traditional national values,” the main idea of which was to protect the Armenian Apostolic Church from the danger of “sects.” It is clear that the RPA could not find any ideological basis other than “traditional values” as it had lost its influence on the public.

On the other hand, the incumbent Prime Minister has also been drawn into this rhetoric and uses the term “sectarian” to defend himself against such accusations. “From here I want to express our commitment to Christianity and the essence of our identity, our commitment to the values of the Armenian Apostolic Church. I myself am a follower of the Armenian Apostolic Church, but I also speak out to our Catholic, Evangelical brothers. We must be faithful to our Christian roots, we must reject totalitarian sects that deprive one of freedom and sovereignty.” This clearly contradicts the principle of separation of church and state. It is not the job of the government to make judgments about the right or wrong of one or another religious organization. It is understandable that the reason for this attitude was to avoid maneuvering in the run-up to the RPA, but on the other hand, the Prime Minister has shown the opposite approach on another occasion.

Since May 2018, a movement under the slogan “New Armenia, new Patriarch” has been launched inside the Armenian Apostolic Church with the aim of overthrowing the Catholicos on charges of ineffective fight against corruption and “sectarianism.” There have been clashes between the two sides, but law enforcement agencies and the government in general have not assisted any party in the conflict. Prime Minister Pashinyan has publicly stated that the church is separate from the state and that he will not interfere in the dispute, which has been an unprecedented approach for Armenia. These two examples show that the new government has not yet adopted a clear policy on this issue.

Demands for the resignation of Catholicos Garegin II are growing. Some ecclesiastical circles are trying to lead the movement, but, except for the need to change the personality of the Catholicos, these circles do not present the issue of church reform to the public. Similar demands have been voiced within the public for a long time, but are the motives of the public and the “opposition” clergy the same?

“New Armenia, New Patriarch” national-church movement is a very interesting case, and it is worth exploring it in a little more detail to understand what the discourse within the church is about, what the clergy argue about. The Movement has issued another call outlining the “ideological” reasons for Garegin II’s resignation. “You could not bring up the illegal authorities who appeared at the head of the state with the paternal discipline. You gave the earth to sects, homosexuals, atheists, opportunists … ” The “New Armenia, New Patriarch” initiative perceived the values of the movement under the slogan “New Armenia” in April as a struggle against “sectarians, atheists, homosexuals, opportunists.”

At the beginning of the 19th and 20th centuries, a reform movement was formed in the Armenian Church. It was initiated by ecclesiastically educated and highly educated clergymen, including prominent figures: Maghachia Ormanyan, Karapet Ter-Mkrtchyan, Garegin Hovsepyan, Babken Kuleseryan, Torgom Gushakshyan, Yervand Ter-Minasyan. They were serious scholars and theologians who were trying to reform the church.

There is no such movement in the church today. With few exceptions, Echmiadzin is a desert of theological and scientific thought. It is no accident that, as in many areas of Armenia, group and material interests are paramount. The number of people trying to exploit the revolutionary situation has also increased in Echmiadzin. The problem is not the resignation of Catholicos Garegin II, but the change of persons must be justified by specific plans for church reform. Otherwise, a change in personality make the situation even worse. This case can lead us to a sad conclusion that there is no serious reform movement in the church.

The political situation in Armenia is not stable, the rating of the new authorities is falling, and the opposition has adopted “national values” and “national traditions” as the main point of criticism. In this case, it is difficult to expect that the incumbent government will take serious steps in religious freedom, in particular by adopting a new law on religious organizations that has been in operation since 1991 or taking steps in the subject of “Armenian Church History” taught in secondary schools, which for many years is in the focus of criticism.